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NOTES

THIRD PARTY MEDICINE-A MODERN GORDIAN KNOT
One of the most pressing problems confronting organized medicine
in the past half century has been the specter of the "third party" and
his effort to interject himself between the physician and the patient
to pay the bills and exert some measure of control over the type of
care rendered. While the physicians have made astounding progress
in the field of substantive medicine, proportionately little of their time
has been given to the problem encountered by the laymen in paying
medical bills. The services of doctors frequently present a severe economic crisis to the family who may receive somewhat staggering bills
in the midst of an emergency or protracted illness. Into the void left
by the physicians' own inattention to this very real problem have
stepped laymen in the form of insurance companies, trusts, corporations, consumers cooperatives and labor groups, all seeking to effectuate some sort of economic arrangement whereby adequate medical
service can be obtained for a group of beneficiaries by pre-payment
and contract.
The response of the medical profession to this intervention has
been less than enthusiastic. The profession has acted to meet the
challenge by (1) approving certain forms of third party practice under
which ultimate control remains in the hands of the profession and the
historical practices of "free choice of physician" and "fee for service"
are retained; (2) sponsoring legislation in the several states to prevent
any other kind of pre-paid medical care plan; (3) availing itself of
the common law prohibition against "corporate practice of medicine";
and (4) using its very powerful disciplinary measures upon individual
physicians to forestall their cooperation with any medical-care plan
which violates any of the criteria felt by organized medicine to be
essential.
It will be the scope of this note to examine the concept of "third
party medicine," to chart the counterattack of organized medicine, and
to review the relevant Kentucky statutes and decisions. Against this
background the note will consider the existing third party medicine dispute in Kentucky between the United Mine Workers and the doctors.
THIRD PARTY MEDICINE-AN ANALYSIS
Traditionally the relationship between patient and physician has
been a personal two-party affair in every aspect of contact, whether it
be the taking of medical history, diagnosis, treatment or compensation for services. The introduction of a person other than the patient
and doctor into this relationship, most frequently as paymaster, is
known to the medical profession as "third party medicine." Doctors
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in the past have viewed the introduction of such a third party at any
stage of the patient-physician relationship as a serious challenge both
to the confidential environment and the the ethical obligation of the
physician to give his undivided loyalty to his patient.
Most frequently, the medical profession has been suspicious of third
party medicine when the latter threatened the patient's free choice of
physician or the accepted method of compensation, the fee for service
rendered. More recently the profession has begun to realize that the
real danger posed by the third party to medicine as a profession, rather
than to medicine as a form of remunerative occupation, stems not
from the threat to free choice of physicians or to the method of compensation, but from the possibility of lay control and domination over
the quality and quantity of medical care, including the facilities, equipment, drugs and techniques of actual treatment to patients.' The
challenge to the time-honored personal relationship between patient
and physician stemming from the activities of hospitals, corporations,
consumer groups and labor unions in offering pre-paid medical service2
to certain beneficiaries without providing for free choice of physican
and on a compensatory basis other than fee for service, has stirred offical action by the various medical societies and vituperative opposition
from some individual doctors. The latter have taken the position that
such arrangements must ultimately lead to a lowering in quality of
medical care, the financial and professional exploitation of the participating doctors by lay groups and the financial ruin of non-participating
physicians. These doctors consider the entire patient-physician relationship as a non-severable unit from the time of choosing the physician
to the final payment of his bill, and maintain that the intervention of
a third party at any state necessarily weakens the entire relationship.
On closer examination, however, it would appear that the patientphysician relationship, while it is continuous, is not necessarily a single
unit, but may be considered as composed of three related, but essentially separate units: (1) the selection of the physician; (2) the professional treatment accorded the patient; and (8) the arrangement for
compensation for services rendered.
Free Choice of Physician
Any pre-paid medical care plan will provide either that the patient
may select without limitation any licensed physician, be treated by
I "Report of the Commission on Medical Care Plans," 169 A.M.A.J. 17 (sp.
ed. 1959).
2The phrase "pre-paid medical care plan" as used in this study refers to
any arrangement under which a non-profit corporation, trust or association
undertakes by contract to provide payment for future medical services rendered
to its beneficiaries. The actual form of pre-payment may be that of insurance
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him, and have the cost of the doctor's services paid by the plan, or
that the patient may expect the plan to pay for treatment only if rendered by one of a limited number of designated "participating physicians". The latter type arrangement is known as a "closed-panel" medical
care plan. The traditional patient-physician relationship has embraced,
at least in theory, an absolute right in the patient to have a free choice
of physicians and there is little doubt but that organized medicine is
squarely behind the theory and desirability of free choice. 3 Although
the doctors have found that the traditional system has worked quite
well from their point of view, they have advanced few persuasive arguments why closed-panel medical care must necessarily render inferior
medical treatment, because of the absence of free choice. Such indeed
has not proven to be the case. In its three-year study, the Commission
on Medical Care Plans appointed by the American Medical Association
concluded that:
Based on its observations, the committee finds that the absence of
"free choice of physician" does not necessarily result in inferior
care; but the committee in no way intends to state that good quality
medical care was rendered in these plans because of the absence
of free choice. 4

Proponents of closed-panel medical care plans contend that the traditional freedom of choice has always been less than free choice in
premiums, periodic payments in advance of service, or contributions by employers
3 into a fund as partial compensation for the labor of their employees.
"Report of the Commission on Medical Care Plans," 169 A.M.A.J. 43 (sp.
ed. 1959) where the committee states that:
"Freedom of choice" means the right of the individual to exercise,
without restraint, selection among alternatives. Furthermore, as applied to medical care, an individual should have the right to select a physician of his choice. The medical profession subscribes to,
ppor and strives to attain complete acceptance and application
of isprinci le of "freedom of choice."
The Principles of Medic Ethics have grappled with the problem of freedom
of choice. In 1955 the AMA apparently satisfied its dissident elements by adopting
a statement that said that "contract practice", meaning the practice of medicine
under an arrangement between a group of physicians and a corporation, was not
per se unethical. 159 A.M.A.J. 1755 (1955). The AMA then set about revising
and shortening its code of ethics. One of the provisions it dropped was that relating to "freedom of choice", and the most recent code stands silent on this point.
164 A.M.A.J. 886 (1957). Proponents of closed-panel plans and Hansen, "Group
Health Plans, A Twenty Year Legal Review," 42 Minn. L. Rev. 527 (1958) see
some significance in the use of the words "participating physicians" in the statements of the AMA known as "Twenty Principles," 140 A.M.A.J. 686 (1949) and
"Guiding Principles for Union Health Centers," 158 A.M.A.J. 835 (1955), which
they interpret as assuming the valid use of closed-panel plans. Such an interpretation, it is submitted, goes against the express recommendations of "Twenty Principles' that all capable physicians be allowed to participate in any plan under
mutually satisfactory arrangements. More significance may be accorded the fact
that the 1957 House of Delegates in remaining silent on the issue of "freedom
of choice' rejected resolutions proposed by some delegates to declare unethical
any plan denying freedom of choice.
4 Op. cit. supra note 1, at 44.
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practice, for the patient's freedom to choose must be limited by his
economic situation and his knowledge of the comparative skills of
the doctors available in his community.5 Doctors participating in
closed-panel plans may have the benefit of continued close professional
contact with other participating physicians, tending to form a professional environment conducive to the best of medical care. Certainly not all physicians are equally competent, and only future experience with closed-panel systems will show how valid has been
the position of organized medicine that utilization of closed-panel
plans will cause the quality of medical care rendered to beneficiaries
to deteriorate.
It would seem clear that free choice of physicians is not sacrosanct or indispensable to good medical care, and that the law should
leave the physicians free to experiment with the closed-panel or
group practice approach to medical care. However, there is unquestionably something to be said against any system of medical care
which, under the pious guise of endorsing experimentation with
closed-panel medical service, is actually seeking to use the paymaster's
power of the purse coupled with an arbitrary exclusion of some
doctors to compel participating physicians to submit to economic exploitation or professional domination at the hand of laymen.
Control of Professional Services
The medical profession has only recently begun to appreciate a
very real area of danger in the field of third party medicine. In the
pre-paid medical care plans studied by the AMA little evidence was
found of actual lay domination of physicians in such matters as choice
of drugs or techniques of diagnosis or treatment. But in every plan
studied, the governing board was composed predominately or completely of laymen. 6 There is inherent in such organizational imbalance
the danger that laymen could come to dominate and control the very
quality of the medical services rendered by the plan's participating
physicians. This could manifest itself in a variety of ways. It could
result in interference with the independent thinking and actions
of the participating physicians, or might result in decisions reflecting
uninformed concepts of diagnosis or treatment held by the laymen
dominating such boards, thereby adversely affecting the medical care
which could be rendered by the plan's participating doctors.
Fee for Service
Traditionally the form of compensation of practicing physicians
has been a fee based on the services rendered. The medical profession
5 Hansen, "Group Health Plans, A Twenty Year Legal Review," 42 Minn. L.
Rev. 527, 544 (1958).
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has taken the position that a physician should not dispose of his
services under terms and conditions which tend to impair or interfere with the complete exercise of his medical judgment7 Some
opponents of medical care plans also contend that any arrangement
whereby a physician is paid a salary rather than a fee for service
tends to economically exploit the doctor by encouraging him to accept less in salaried remuneration than he might expect in fees in
exchange for economic security. Whether or not a particular doctor is
being commercially exploited would depend on his arrangement for
compensation; but it is unrealistic to assume that utilization of salaried
compensation rather than fee for service necessarily involves the exploitation of the physician. To the contrary, it could be argued that
the salary arrangement gives the physician the maximum income
which he feels he is capable of demanding, based on his individual
capabilities. Moreover, the salary arrangement affords the doctor relief from the administrative and economic concerns of private practice
and may thereby actually improve his capabilities as a physician by
allowing him to concentrate his attentions solely on his professional
work. The problem of third party medicine can not be resolved by
saying either that fee for service or salaried compensation is the
one acceptable form of professional remuneration.
It is submitted that neither free choice of physician nor fee for
service is indispensable to good medical care. Such a conclusion is
supported by the recently completed study by the AMA's Commission on Medical care plans which, after studying innumerable pre-paid
medical care plans which embodied both closed-panel practice
and salaried compensation, remarked:
Based on its observations, the committee believes that the quality
of medical care rendered to subscribers by the units visited, and
within the scope of the services offered, is comparable to the average level of care which members of the committee have observed
in their years of medical practice.8

However the doctor be selected or paid, it is essential that the patientphysician relationship be kept personal and confidential, and that the
doctor remain absolutely free to treat his patient to the best of his
ability, without lay interference or control. Wherever closed-panel
practice or salaried remuneration arrangements are used as devices
for securing lay domination of the actual treatment of patients, they
are to be condemned by court decision, legislation or by disciplinary
action by organized medicine. So long as the physician remains free
60 p. cit. supra note 1, at 17.
7 "Principles of Medical Ethics," 164 A.M.A.f. 886 (1957).
8 Op. cit. supra note 1, at 52.

KENTUcKy LAW JouRNAL

[Vol. 48,

to utilize his professional skill to the best of his ability to aid his patient,
no medical care plan should be condemned merely because it utilizes
closed-panels of doctors or compensates its participants on other than
a fee for service basis.
THE COUNTERATTACK OF ORGANIZED MEDICINE
State Legislation
It is clearly within the police powers of the states to enact comprehensive legislation rigidly regulating the practice of medicine.9
All of the states have enacted what are commonly called "medical
practice acts," which set forth the qualifications which a person must
possess in order to be licensed to practice medicine within the state.
The typical licensing statute requires that the applicant be a graduate of a recognized medical school, be of good moral character and
pass an examination calculated to test his skill in the medical arts.10
The purpose of such legislation is to protect the public from those
applicants whose training, ability or morality are felt to be insufficient.
Manifestly the segment of the public sought to be protected is that
of the prospective patients, rather than the competing licensed physicians. So long as the persons ministering to the maladies of the public
are licensed physicians, the collective purpose of such statutes would
appear to be satisfied. These statutes would therefore have no application where it is not the ability of a physician which is at issue,
but the condition of his employment.
Many medical practice acts list the conditions under which a
license may be suspended or revoked. Frequently such statutes forbid
any licensed physician to allow another person to use his license to
practice medicine. 1 Thus it should not be surprising to find, in the
section of this note dealing with corporate practice of medicine, an
argument being made that when a physician performs medical services for a hospital under an arrangement whereby he is paid a salary
and the hospital collects and retains the fee, he is violating the medical
practice act by aiding an unlicensed "person" to practice medicine.
Some forty states have now moved beyond this area of medical
practice acts to specify in "enabling acts" the conditions under which
pre-paid medical care plans may be organized.12 In this area the medical profession has endeavored to persuade state legislatures to allow
9 Douglas v. Noble, 261 U.S. 165 (1928).
104 Am. Jur. Physicians and Surgeons § 32 (1942).
11 A typical statute is Vernon's Tex. St. 1948, Art. 4505, § 12. See Rockett
v. State Board of Medical Examiners, 287 S.W. 2d 190 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956),
10 S.W.
L.J. 831 (1956).
12 For an excellent examination of such state statutes in depth, a study which
is beyond the scope of this note, see Hansen, "Group Health Plans, A Twenty
Year Legal Review," 42 Minn. L. Rev. 527 (1958).
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only such medical care plans as are controlled by members of the
profession.' 3 Twenty-six states' 4 now statutorily sanction only those
plans which give administrative control to physicians, provide free
choice of doctors and provide for compensation by fee for service, such
as the Blue Shield plans. 15 Passage of such restrictive legislation has
not put the question totally at rest in at least one state. In Complete
Service Bureau v. San Diego County Medical soc'y,16 laymen had
organized a closed-panel medical care corporation under the state's
general non-profit corporation act. This plan was challenged by the
local medical society as operating in violation of the state's restrictive
statute, which purported to limit medical care plans to those of the
Blue Shield type. The court held that the enabling act was permissive rather than mandatory, and allowed the corporation to continue
its activities. It meaningfully stated by way of dictum that to interpret the restrictive enabling statute as stating the only method by
which a medical care plan could be incorporated would bring the
statute under attack as unconstitutionally creating a monopoly in
7
private interests.'
CorporatePractice of Medicine
At common law the rule is that a corporation, though it is for
some purposes a person, has neither the right nor the power to practice
a learned profession, such as medicine. 8 More explicitly, it is the
majority rule in this country that a corporation which employs a
physician to perform medical services, paying the physician a salary,
and itself colecting and retaining a fee for services performed, thereby
engages in the practice of medicine without a license. 19
13 Id. at 527-28.
14

Hansen, supra note 12, at 531 n. 13.

IS Hansen, supra note 12, at 529.

1643 Cal. 2d 201, 272 P. 2d 497 (1954).
17 It is beyond the scope of this note to discuss the effect of state insurance
laws on medical care plans. The reasons which such laws have been held not to
restrict pre-paid medical care plans have been stated in Jordan v. Group Health
Ass'n, 107 F.2d 239 (D.C. Cir. 1939), and California Physicians' Service v. Garrison, 28 Cal.2d 790, 172 P.2d 4 (1946). See also Annot. 167 A.L.R. 322, 323
(1947).
IsParker v. Board of Dental Examiners, 216 Cal. 285, 14 P.2d 67 (1932);
People ex rel. Kerner v. United Medical Service, 362 Ill. 442, 200 N.E. 157

(1936).

19 People ex rel. State Board of Medical Examiners v. Pacific Health Corp.,
12 Cal.2d 156, 82 P.2d 429 (1938); Pacific Employers' Ins. Corp. v. Carpenter,
10 Cal.App.2d 592, 52 P.2d 992 (1935); People v. Painless Parker Dentist, 85
Colo. 304, 275 P. 928 (1929); People ex rel. Kerner v. United Medical Service,
362 IM. 442, 200 N.E. 157 (1936); State ex rel. Indiana State Board of Dental
Examiners v. Boston System Dentist, 215 Ind. 485, 19 N.E.2d 949 (1939); Kendall
v. Beiling, 295 Ky. 782, 175 S.W.2d 489 (1943); McMurdo v. Getter, 298 Mass.

363, 10 N.E.2d 139 (1937); People v. J. H. Woodbury Dermatological Institute,
192 N.Y. 454, 85 N.E. 697 (1908); Bartron v. Codington County, 68 S.D. 309, 2
N.W.2d 337 (1942); Rockette v. State Board of Medical Examiners, 287 S.W.2d
190 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956).
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The rationale behind such a rule has varied from court to court.
One approach has been to say that the licensing statutes require of the
applicant some personal, educational and moral qualifications which
cannot be possessed by an inanimate corporation. 20 This approach is
superficial and ignores the fact that all acts of medical care are
performed, not by the fictional corporate "person", but by licensed
professionals who have been found by the licensing officials to possess
the requisite training, skill and morality. Another judicial attitude is
that to permit a corporation to practice medicine through licensed
physicians is to commercialize and debase the profession. 21 A third
approach suggests that to permit corporations to engage in such activities would be to subject the physician to a divided loyalty-to his
employer and to his patient.22 One court has expressed this divided
of the doctor,
loyalty as a conflict between the professional standards
23
and the profit motive of his corporate employer.
The proceedings by which the common-law rule can be invoked
26
2
include quo warranto,24 criminal prosecution, 5 malpractice suits,
revocation or suspension of the license of the practitioner 27 and actions
for declaratory judgment. 28 Thus, in any case where organized medicine feels that the rule is being violated, it may wield a double-edged
sword. It may initiate a criminal action or quo warranto against the
offending corporation for practicing medicine without a license and
it may seek the suspension or revocation of the license of any participating physician on the ground that he is aiding an abetting another
to so practice (at least in states where such action is ground for
revocation).
On closer examination the actual rule prohibiting corporate practice
of medicine is much narrower than the statement of the "majority rule"
above. All of the cases which have prohibited corporate activity in the
20 Dr. Allison, Dentist Inc. v. Allison, 360 IMI.638, 639, 196 N.E. 799, 800
(1935), stating:
It [the corporation] can have neither honesty or conscience, and its
loyalty must . . . be yielded to its managing officers, its directors and
its stockholders.
See also McMurdo v. Getter, 298 Mass. 363, 10 N.E.2d 139 (1937).
21 Los Angeles County v. Ford, 121 Cal. App. 2d 407, 263 P.2d 638 (1953)
(dictum).
22 McMurdo v. Getter, 298 Mass. 363, 10 N.E.2d 139 (1937).
23 People ex rel. State Board of Medical Examiners v. Pacific Health Corp.,
12 Cal.2d
156, 82 P.2d 429 (1938).
24
'People ex rel. Kerner v. United Medical Service, 362 IMI.442, 200 N.E.
157 25
(1936).

People v.J. H.Woodbury Dermatological Institute, 192 N.Y. 454, 85 N.E.
697 (1908).
2
6 Youngstown Park and Falls St. R.R. v. Kessler, 84 Ohio St. 74, 95 N.E. 509
(1911).
2

7 Parker v. State Board of Dental Examiners, 216 Cal. 285, 14 P.2d 67
(1932).
28 Group Health Ass'n v. Moor, 24 F.Supp. 445 (D.D.C. 1938).

NOTES

1959]

field of medicine or related professions have one significant element
in common: all concerned corporations organized to make a profit.-20
The majority common-law rule might be re-stated more accurately as
prohibiting a corporation organized for profit from practicing medicine
through licensed physicians.
Why not apply the same rule to corporations whether organized
fcr profit or not? In Los Angeles County v. Ford,30 a writ of mandamus was sought to compel a county official to execute a contract
which would provide for the rendition of medical services in the
county hospital by the staff of a medical school. The defendant contended that the contracts would be invalid in that the envisioned performance thereof would constitute the unlawful practice of medicine
by the corporate medical school. The court examined at some length
the doctrine prohibiting corporate practice of medicine, and found it
to rest on the public policy of protecting the public from the commercial exploitation of the practice of medicine. It cited with approval
the dictum in People ex rel. State Board of Medical Examiners v.
Pacific Health Corp.31 This latter case had distinguished between
profitable and benevolent furnishing of medical services and had
indicated that the actions of non-profit corporations were not comparable with those of profit corporations, stating:
Since the principal evils attendant on corporate practice of medicine
spring from the conflict between professional standards and obligations

of the doctors and the profit motive of the corporate employer, it may
well be concluded3 2that the objections of policy do not apply to nonprofit institutions.

Where a non-profit corporation is involved, none of the social problems
of divided loyalty or commercial exploition are likely to be involved,
since the corporate employer has no profit motive before which to
sacrifice the professional standards of its employee, but merely acts
to provide the arrangements and facilities with which the rendition of
services is accomplished.33
Perhaps the leading case in the area of non-profit medical care plans
was Group Health Assn v. Moor,34 wherein a closed-panel medical care
plan was charged with illegally practicing medicine. Its modus operan29 In every case cited above, the corporations which were found to be
illegally practicing medicine were for-profit corporations. No case has been

found where a non-profit corporation was held to be illegally practicing medi-

cine without a license. See United States v. American Medical Ass'n, 110 F.2d
703 (D.C.Cir. 1940).

121 Cal. App.2d 407, 263 P.2d 638 (1953).
31 12 Cal2d 156, 82 P.2d 429 (1938).
32 Id at 157, 82 P.2d at 431.
30

33

Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound v. King County Medical Soc'y,

39 Wash.2d 586, 237 P.2d 737 (1951).
3424 F.Supp. 445 (D.D.C. 1938).
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di was to contract with licensed physicians to furnish medical services
to the corporation's membership in return for salaried compensation.
The court held that such an arrangement was not the practice of medicine. In reviewing this decision in Jordan v. Group Health Ass'n,35 the
circuit court of appeals stated that the reason usually given for prohibiting the purveyance of medical services by a corporation did not
apply to a non-profit corporation providing medical services to its membership by prepayment and contract with licensed physicians. Later in
United States v. American Medical Ass'n 36 the same court said it had
been unable to find any case where a court had held a non-profit corporation furnishing medical care to its membership to be illegally practicing medicine.
It is not suggested that the non-profit nature of the corporation is
conclusive.8 7 It is not the economic structure of the corporation, but
the measure of control exercised or likely to be exercised over the professional services of its participating physicians which should be controlling. Non-profit corporations have met with favor in the courts because the absence of the profit feature makes it unlikely that the corporation will try to dominate the professional aspects of the services
rendered. Whatever the structure of the corporation, if it substantially
controls activities such as diagnosis and treatment, it is illegally engaged in the practice of medicine.
Disciplinary Powers of Organized Medicine
In its counterattack against third party medicine, the professions
prize weapons are its powers to exclude licensed physicians from membership in local, state and national medical associations and to disci.
pline, fine or expel members in such associations. Any discussion of the
occasions when and the means by which organized medicine can use
these powers to forestall third party practice would be meaningless
without an understanding of the organizational framework and the
value of membership in the various medical societies.
35 107 F.2d 239 (D.C.Cir. 1939).

110 F.2d 239 (D.C.Cir. 1940).
3 Some courts have taken the position that the relationship between the
36

corporation and the plan is basically that of a corporation and its agent, rather
than a principal and his agent or an employer and his employee, since the typical
medical care corporation makes no effort to control the doctor in the rendition
of his professional services. Under such an approach the doctor is not an "agent"
allowing his "principal" to practice medicine through his license. State ElectroMedical Institute v. State, 74 Neb. 40, 103 N.W. 1078 (1905) used this rational
to approve the activities of a non-profit corporation, as did a federal district
court in Group Health Ass'n v. Moore, 24 F.Supp. 445 (D.D.C. 1938). It is
submitted that this is but an alternative rationale to the non-profit corporation
approach invoking the same factor of lack of plan control over the physician, and,
as such, constitutes little more than a make-weight argument. See Annot. A.L.R.
1240 (1936) and a critical comment, 27 Marq. L. Rev. 135 (1943).
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The American Medical Association (AMA) is a federation of state
medical associations, which are known as "constituent associations" 8
The state medical associations may and do charter county or district
societies. The parent AMA has its own constitution, by-laws and code
of ethics. The state and local groups also have their own constitutions
and by-laws, but accept the code of ethics of the AMA as stating at
least their minimum ethical standards. Membership in the AMA is predicated upon membership in a local and state society. In turn, the
local society determines its own qualifications for admission into membership. Disciplinary action is initiated by the county society which
acts as a trial court. From its decision an appeal may be taken to the
state association, and then to the Judicial Council of the AMA, if the aggrieved physician is a member of that parent body. Appeals to the
state courts are rarely entertained before the defendant has exhausted
his appellate remedies within the quasi-legal framework of the organization itself.39
It is difficult for the layman to understand the value that members
of the medical profession place on society membership. The physician
realizes that without such affaliation he faces social ostracism, loss of
hospital privileges, 40 difficulties in obtaining specialist consultations,
increased cost of malpractice insurance and loss of community prestige.41 Beyond these there exists the consequence that to many physicians is the most dread of all: most specialty boards within the profession require as one prerequisite to certification membership in a
local medical society. That is, a physician may have the skill and training to be worthy of certification as a specialist, but if he has been
denied membership in a local medical society, the door to his certification remains closed to him, in most fields.42 Against this background of
organizational framework, disciplinary procedure, and value of membership, let us view the actual use of organized medicine's disciplinary
powers.
Medical societies, like other voluntary membership societies, are
commonly endowed with the power to control admission to and expulsion from membership by the establishment of by-laws, codes of
38 Op.
30

cit. supra note 1, at 42.
Weyrens v. Scotts Bluff County Medical Soc'y, 183 Neb. 814, 277 N.W.
878 (1938); but cf. Medical Socy of Mobile County v. Walker, 245 Ala. 185,
16 So.2d 321 (1944).
40 A majority of American courts uphold the right of a private hospital to
deny use of its facilities and staff privileges to licensed physicians. Hughes v.
Good Samaritan Hospital, 289 Ky. 123, 158 S.W.2d 159 (1942) and cases collected to Annot., 24 A.L.R. 2d 850 (1952).
41 110 F.2d 703, 711 (D.C.Cir. 1940).
42 GopHealth Cooperative of Puget Sound v. King County Medical
Soc'y, 39 Wash.2d 586, 237 P.2d 737 (1951).
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ethical conduct and regulation. 43 These powers, though broadly discretionary, are not limitless. In order for a by-law or a code of conduct
of a medical society to be valid, it must have a reasonable relationship
to the objects and purposes of the society's creation. 44 If the by-laws,
ethical rules and regulations adopted by the society have this "reasonable relationship", the society may use them as a basis for exclusion from membership, or for fine or expulsion of members who
violate them.45 Such action may be justifiably based on a violation of
the rules of the society assented to by its members and known to
them, or on such other conduct which is found to violate the funda40
mental objects of the society.
In many instances where the courts have had occasion to pronounce
invalid by-laws or codes of ethics of medical socities, they have described the offending rules as contravening public policy, 47 a guide
which is uncomfortably vague. A more workable test is found in the
New York case of Rockmore v. Fein4" where the court upheld the
ethical code of a society of pathologists, stating:
The requirements, I find, have a reasonable connection with improving and maintaining the conditions
and standards under which
49
the members practice their profession.

Admitting that there are limits beyond which the medical societies
may not go in disciplining their members, or denying membership to
qualified aspirants, 50 what actions may these societies take to impede
the advance of third party medicine? Consider the early case of People ex rel. Gray v. Medical Soc'y of Erie County5' where the power
of a medical society to expel members for failure to adhere to a minimum fee schedule of the society was struck down as having no reasonable connection with the purposes of the society. An English case,
43

44

1857).

41 Am. Jur. Physicians and Surgeons § 151 (1942).
People ex rel. Gray v. Medical Soc'y of Erie County, 24 Barb. 570 (N.Y.

45 Porter v. King County Medical Soc'y, 186 Wash. 410, 58 P.2d 874

(1942).
46

mith v. Kern County Medical Ass'n, 19 Cal.2d 263, 120 P.2d 874

(1942).
4

7 Walker v. Medical Soc'y of Mobile County, 237 Ala. 169, 22 So.2d 715
(1945); Bernstein v. Alameda-Contra Costa Medical Ass'n, 139 Cal. App.2d 241,
293 P.2d 862 (1956); Kantrowitz v. Candelario, 163 N.Y.2d 297 (1957); People
ex rel. Gray v. Medical Soc'y of Erie County, 24 Barb. 570 (N.Y. 1857).

N.Y.S.2d 409 (1950).
Id. at 411.
0Illustrative of the latitude and limitations of judicial attitudes towards

4899

49
5

medical societies in their attempts to screen applicants for membership are People
ex. rel. Waring v. The Georgia Medical Soc'y, 32 Ga. 608 (1869); Irvine v.
Lorco, 169 La. 1090, 126 So. 669 (1930); Harris v. Thomas, 217 S.W. 1068
(Tex. Civ. App. 1920); Porter v. King County Medical Soc'y, 186 Wash. 410,
58 P.2d -367 (1936).
51 24 Barb. 570 (N.Y. 1857).
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Pratt v. British Medical Ass'n,52 invalidated disciplinary action by the
defendant on the finding that:
The alleged sin was financial rather than moral in its character....
The question of ethics, as that word is ordinarily understood, had
nothing to do with the case.53 (Emphasis added)

In Group Health Cooperative v. King County Medical Socy, 54 the
court reflected a widespread judical hostility toward confusing principles of professional ethics with the economics of competition, stating:
The Society, in characterizing appellants' contract practice as "unethical" is making an unusual and arbitrary application of that opprobrius term. It is not using that term as a label for conduct which
is violative of some established moral principle applicable to the medical profession. Rather, it here uses the term to castigate those who
seek to carry on their own contract practice independent of and in
competition with Service Corporation [Blue Shield].55

These cases indicate that where organized medicine adopts by-laws
or codes of medical ethics to govern its membership, these will be
subject to court examination when used as bases for exclusion or
expulsion from membership of licensed physicians. If the regulation
is reasonably calculated to maintain the ethical standards5" of the
profession, it will be upheld. If however, it merely disguises an attempt to create or perpetuate an economic monopoly, courts will not
5
hesitate to invalidate it. 7

Beyond these limitations which the law has placed on medicine's
use of its disciplinary powers insofar as they affect members of the
profession, the courts have placed additional restrictions on such
activities where they adversely affect a trade or business of others.
If the activities of a medical society adversely affect a trade or business, the society may find itself the defendant in an antitrust suit

based on federal or state laws. Such laws characteristically prohibit
52

[1919] 1 K. B. 244.

53 Id.at

272.

54 89 Wash.2d 586, 237 P.2d 737 (1951).
5556 237 P.2d at 768.
Argument may some day be made by the medical societies that it is as
important to good medical care to protect the economic standards of doctors,
as it is their ethical standards. Certainly it should be considered a legitimate
endeavor for a medical society to seek to protect the economic welfare of its
members insofar as necessary to prevent their economic condition from becoming
so depressed as to seriously impair the ability of its members to render adequate
medical care. The courts have become adamant, not at the mention of medical
economics, but at the pious assertion that any form of group practice or salaried
compensation is unethical, as that word is commonly understood. At the present
time organized medicine is making little effort to enlist the sympathies of either
the public or the courts in relation to any widespread "depressed economic condition" of its members.
5739 Wash.2d 586, 237 P.2d 737 (1951).
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persons from, entering into contracts, agreements or monoplies in
restraint of trade, and are as much a limitation on the physician and
his membership society as they are on any other combination of
persons.
The most important case in this area is American Medical Asen
v. United States58 where the Attorney General of the United States
obtained and prosecuted an indictment against the named defendant, its constituent society and certain named individuals, charging
a conspiracy in restraint of trade of Group Health Association, a
closed-panel non-profit corporation engaged in providing medical
and hospital services to its members through the contract device. The
prosecution was brought under section three of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 50 a section having application to trade in the District of
Columbia, rather than to interstate commerce. The district court dismissed the indictment on the ground that the business of Group
Health involved hospital and medical services which did not constitute a "trade" within the meaning of the act. 0 The district judge
ruled specifically that "trade" in the Sherman Act had no reference
to any of the learned professions. On appeal, the judgment was reversed by the circuit court of appeals which specifically held that
the profession of medicine had been considerd a "trade" under the
common law of monopolies, and was a "trade" within the meaning
62
of the Sherman Act. 61 The Supreme Court denied certiorari.
At the subsequent trial the American Medical Association was
convicted of the charges, including concerted action of screening and
refusing membership to participating physicians of Group Health,
denying staff privileges in hospitals, refusing specialist consultation
with doctors serving the plan, and threatening expulsion of its members who were (or were considering) participating therein-all for
the purpose of coercing licensed physicians to refuse to work for the
offending medical care corporation. On appeal the judgment was
afflnned,6 3 the circuit court of appeals remarking, in reference to the
broad disciplinary powers which have been judicially accorded to the
medical societies, that:
There is a very real difference between the use of such self-discipline and an effort on the part of such an association to destroy competing professional or business groups or organizations.64
58 817 U.S. 519 (1948).
5915
U.S.C. § 8 (1952).
60
United States v. American Medical Ass'n, 28 F.Supp. 752 (D.D.C.

1939).
61 110 F.2d 703 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
62810 U.S. 644 (1940).
63 130 F.2d 233 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
64 Id. at 248.
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari, but found it unnecessary to
decide the question whether or not the practice of medicine constitutes a "trade" within the meaning of the Sherman Act. 5 It held
that Group Health was a membership corporation engaged in the
trade or business of providing medical and hospital services, and
that its status as such brought parties whose activities reflected a
conspiracy to destroy it under the prohibitions of the Sherman Act.66
It stated that:
As the Court of Appeals properly remarked, the calling or occupation of the individual [defendant] physicians is immaterial if the

purpose and effect of their conspiracy was such obstruction and
restraint of Group Health.67

In addition to being subject to prosecutions or actions for civil
damages under the Sherman Act, medical societies also find their activities hampered by the application of state anti-trust statutes or common law. In Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound v. King
County Medical Soc'y,68 injunctive relief was sought under a state
anti-trust statute against the activities of the medical society in screening applicants and threatening members with expulsion from membership for the purpose of preventing doctors from participating in a
plan which was competing with a society-approved Blue Shield type
plan. .The defendant society contended that the competing plan was
violating the "corporate practice of medicine" rule and sought refuge
in its own code of ethics which disapproved members participating
in any plan of physician compensation other than fee for service. The
court granted the injunction and held that a mere conflict between
the ethical code of a medical society and the compensation arrangement of a medical care plan does not automatically justify the systematic screening or expulsion of physicians participating therein.
The court stated that the particular provision of the code of ethics
relied on by the defendants was actually a disguised restraint on
economic competition.
In both the American Medical Ass'n and the King County cases
the courts held that medical societies were not justified in taking or
threatening disciplinary actions against members or systematically
screening applicants merely because the affected physicians participated in a closed-panel medical care plan which operated on other
than a fee for service basis of compensation. If the societies wish to
enforce by-laws or codes of ethics against recalcitrant members with65317 U.S. 519 (1943).
6 Cf. United States v. Oregon Medical Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326 (1952).
67317 U.S. 519 (1943).
6839 Wash. 2d 586, 237 P.2d 737 (1951); Cf. Complete Service Bureau v.
San Diego Med. Socy, 43 Cal. 2d 201, 272, P. 2d 497 (1954).
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out running afoul of the anti-trust laws, they had best heed the clear
message of the instruction to the jury given by the court in the
AMA conspiracy trial:
Ifit be true ... that the District Society, acting only to protect its
organization, regulate fair dealing among its members, and maintain and advance the standards of medical practice, adopted reasonable rules and measures to these ends not calculated to restrain
Group Health, there would be no guilt though the indirect
0 9 effect

may have been to cause some restraint against Group Health.

THIRD PARTY MEDICINE IN KENTUCKY
Kentucky has a rather typical Medical Practice Act which sets
forth the basic requirements for licensing and the conditions under
which a license may be suspended or revoked. 70 It requires that an
applicant be a graduate of a recognized medical college, have interned
for a period of one year, be of good moral character and meet certain
personal requirements of age and citizenship. Beyond these minimum
requirements, the legislature has in KRS sec. 311.565 (1) granted to
the Board of Health broad powers to issue additional regulations, and
prescribe standards and tests which the applicant must meet. The
purpose of the licensing statute is specifically stated to be "to prevent
7
empiricism and protect the public health and safety of the public." '
The Act makes specific provisions for suspension or revocation of
licenses on several stated grounds, including engaging in unprofessional conduct and aiding and abetting an unlicensed person to practice medicine. 72 KRS sec. 311.595 (k) makes it a ground for revocation that a physician had "violated the code of conduct promulgated
by the board [of health] under subsection (4) of KRS § 311.600."
This Code of Conduct was directed to be based on generally
recognized principles of professional ethical conduct. 73
Pursuant to this statutory authority, the State Board of Health
in 1952 promulgated such a code, article three of which provides:
No person licensed to practice medicine or osteopathy shall dispose
of his professional attainments or services to any corporation, hospital, lay body, lay organization, lay group or lay individual by whatever name called or however organized, under terms or conditions
which permit exploitation of the services of the physician for the financial profit of the agency concerned.74 (Emphasis added)
69 American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519, 533 (1943).
70 Ky.Rev. Stat. § 311.570 (1959), hereinafter referred to in text as KRS.
7
1Ky. Rev. Stat. § 311.555 (1959).
72Ky. Rev. Stat. § 311.595 (1959).
73 Ky. Rev. Stat. § 811.565 (2)(c) (1959).
74 Itis beyond the scope of this note to consider whether such a delegation of authority to an administrative agency to create specific grounds for
license revocation is constitutional, or if the statute and code viewed as a unit
comprise class legislation. The problem of delegation may be felt to be particu-
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This Code of Conduct is the one significant feature of the Kentucky
Medical Practice Act which sets it apart from the general statutes of
other states, which have already been considered. Three observations
can be made as to the final provision adopted by the Board of Health:
(1) it presumes that some form of group practice may legally exist
without violating this rule; (2) it does not prohibit physicians working for medical care plans controlled by laymen; and (3) it does
not purport to decree the sanctity of either fee for service or free
choice of physicians.
Should the Kentucky Court of Appeals be faced with a problem
of medical participation in lay-sponsored pre-paid medical care plans,
it might consider significant the fact that the section of the Medical
Practice Act relating to the practice of Chiropody75 and the chapter
of the statutes relating to Dentistry' both provide that the practitioner
must practice under his own name, and not the name of any company,
while the portion of the Medical Practice Act relating to physicians
makes no such provision. The Court of Appeals, faced with the blank
wall of legislative intent, might read the Board's Code of Conduct
together with the statute's silence on practicing under the doctor's
own name and infer that a physician is not limited to private practice,
but may experiment with various kinds of group practice.
Beyond its Medical Practice Act, Kentucky has a statutory chapter dealing specifically with Medical Service Plans under which persons desiring to form a medical care plan may incorporate under the
Commonwealth's Nonprofit Corporation Act.7 No such plan is allowed
to operate in any county unless fifty-one percent of the licensed physicians therein are participants.7 8 The statute purports to give to any
reputable licensed physician the right to become a participating physician in the plan "under such terms and conditions as are imposed
on other participating physicians under similar circumstances." 79
Much can be said for the legislation in this area. It contains the
excellent provision that:
[A] medical service plan corporation shall impose no restrictions

on the doctors of medicine who treat the subscribers as to methods
of diagnosis or treatment.8 0

It guarantees to the subscribers of the plan a free choice of physican
among the doctors participating in the plan, and purports to allow
larly open to challenge wherein Ky. Rev. Stat. § 311.600 (4) (1959) leaves
open the possibility that such Code of Conduct might be changed in the future.
75Ky. Rev. Stat. § 311.460 (1959).
76Ky. Rev. Stat. § 313.240 (1959).
77
78 Ky. Rev. Stat. § 303.160 (1) (1959).
Ky. Rev. Stat. § 303.180 (1959).
79Ky. Rev. Stat. § 303.190 (1959).
8o Ibid.
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every desirous and licensed physician to participate. It thus leaves a
certain flexibility in the area of free choice of physician, and makes
no provision attempting to specify any one approved compensation
arrangement. On the other hand, the statute is unfortunately vague
in critical areas. For example, it provides for a required participation
of fifty-one percent of the licensed doctors in an area before the
plan may operate within a county, but it does not deal with the
ability of a majority of the doctors in such an area to render a particular plan illegal within their county by the simple expedient of boycotting it. It provides for the right of all doctors to participate in the
plan ff they so desire, but makes no specific statutory remedy for
any breach of the statute by the plan in purposely excluding some
physicians. It is submitted that the statute gives an unreasonable and
unnecessary power to the State Board of Health. All articles of incorporation of such corporations must be approved by the Board,
such approval to be based on its determination of "convenience and
necessity and in the public interest."81 All contracts of the medical
care corporations, whether with subscribers or with participating physicians are to be approved by the Board, and no criteria are set
forth for their approval or disapproval. It is undoubtedly these features of Kentucky's statutory scheme which prompted the author of
a recent law journal article to classify Kentucky as a state having a
"restrictive" enabling act, meaning that the administration of medical
care plans is ultimately given to doctors. 2 Most of the state statutes
which have been classified as "restrictive" limit the ability to form and
the administration of such plans to physicians. Kentucky is more subtle: any person, layman or physician, can form and administer a
medical care plan; but the ultimate supervisory control is placed
in the State Board of Health, the bulk of whose membership is comprised of licensed physicians. It is recommended that the legislature
act to curb any tendency towards monopolistic control of medical
care plans83 by eliminating the requirement that the Board approve
articles of incorporation of such plans, leaving that power solely in
the Secretary of State, and divert the supervisory control of medical
service contracts from the Board to the Department of Insurance.
Kentucky has had only three cases dealing with the field of corporate practice of medicine, and all three of these were decided prior
to the 1952 modernization of the Medical Practice Act and the promulgation of the Board's Code of Conduct. Forman v. State Board of
81Ky.
Rev. Stat. § 303.160 (3) (1959).
82
Hansen, "Group Health Plans, A Twenty Year Legal Review," 42 Minn.

L. Rev. 527, 531 n. 13 (1958).
83

Cf. Complete Service Bureau v. San Diego County Medical Soc'y, 43

Cal.2d 201, 272 P.2d 497 (1954).
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Health 4 held that a salaried physician who had aided another in conducting a medical institute was not guilty of an offense of moral turpitude and could not be deprived of his license under the statutory provision then existing. Johnson v. Stumbo8 5 was a suit to enforce a
covenant not to compete given by the defendant when he assigned to
the plaintiffs certain hospital service contracts he had obtained, the
defense was that contracts to render hospital services were nonassignable to a corporation, because the performance of such contracts
would constitute the illegal practice of medicine by a corporation. The
corporation in question had been formed by several individual doctors
for the express purpose of running a hospital and servicing the assigned
contracts. The court held that the contracts related to hospital rather
than to medical services and stated that a corporation could perform
the usual services of a hospital. In addition, the court stated its opinion
that corporations can not practice medicine even through licensed
physicians. In Kendall v. Beiling,80 the revocation of the license of
an optometrist was allowed on the statutory ground that he had aided
and abetted an unlicensed person to practice optometry. The defendant examined patients and fitted lenses as a salaried employee of a
for-profit corporation. The fees for his work were collected and retained
by the corporation. The court broadly stated that:
While a corporation is a person for many purposes ....
one cannot be
licensed to practice a learned profession, which can be done only
by an individual who has received a license to do so after proving
his qualifications and knowledge of the subject. A corporation
can87
not lawfully engage in the practice of law or medicine.

Kentucky has no statutory anti-trust law prohibiting conspiracies
in restraint of trade. However, the common law of monopolies is in
force in this State. s At common law, contracts, agreements or combinations in unreasonable restraint of trade or having a tendency to
destroy or restrict competition are against public policy and so are forbidden. 0 At least two courts have specifically stated that at common
law the phrase, "restraint of trade", was deemed to cover the practice
of medicine. 90
84 157 Ky. 123, 162 S.W. 196 (1919).

85277 Ky. 301, 126 S.W.2d 165 (1938).'
80295 Ky. 782, 175 S.W.2d 489 (1943).
87 Id. at 789, 175 S.W.2d at 493.
8
Elkins v. Barclay, 243 Ky. 144, 47 S.W.2d 945 (1932); Scobee v. Brent,

185 Ky. 734, 216 S.W. 76 (1919).
89Jackson v. Sullivan, 276 Ky. 666, 124 S.W.2d 1019 (1939); Love v.
Kozy 0Theatre Co., 193 Ky. 336, 236 S.W. 243 (1922).
9 United States v. American Medical Ass'n, 110 F.2d 703 (D.C. Cir.
1940); Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound v. King County Medical Soc'y,

39 Wash.2d 586, 237 P.2d 737 (1951).
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THE UNITED MINE WORKERS DISPUTE
The running battle of the 1940's between organized medicine
and Group Health is being replaced in the states of the coal mining
industry with an equally bitter altercation between the United Mine
Workers and organized medicine. This problem is of particular and
immediate interest in the Commonwealth of Kentucky where the
Union has erected a chain of expensive modem hospitals, imported a
sizeable number of competent physicians 91 and successfully fought
92
against a recent attempt at restrictive legislation.
The United Mine Workers of America's Welfare and Retirement
Fund was created as an irrevocable trust by the National Bituminous
Coal Wage Agreement of 1950, pursuant to the Federal Management
Relations Act of 1947 (Taft-Hartley), which permitted payments to
be made by employers into trusts for the benefit of the employees and
their families. 93 The Fund thus created was initially financed by a
royalty of five cents per ton of coal mined by Union workers, and
has gradually been increased to its present rate of forty cents per
ton. The Fund has built ten modem hospitals in the Kentucky- West
Virginia area. These hospitals contain approximately one thousand
beds and were built at an estimated cost of thirty-five million dollars.
These are divided into three larger hospitals and seven smaller "satellite" hospitals. Each hospital is staffed by an "active" and a "courtesy"
staff. The active staff is composed of full-time physician employees
of the Fund and of part-time participating physicians who wish an
active role in the affairs of the hospital. The courtesy staff is composed of other part-time participating physicians who desire to use
the facilities, but not to participate in staff deliberations.
The staff of each hospital has been organized according to the
basic plan of staff organization suggested by the Joint Committee on
Accreditation of Hospitals.94 The staff organization in each hospital
has a full-time chief of service who is board-certified in his respective
91The Union claims that its Fund has brought into the areas of Eastern
Kentucky affected by its operation six Pediatricians, eight Obstetricians and
Gynecologists, seventeen Internists, five Radiologists, five Pathologists, nine Surgeons, two Orthopedic Surgeons, two Psychiatrists, three Gastroenterologists,
two Cardiologists, two Anesthesiologists and two Pulmonary Physiologists. Before
the Fund began its operation, thre were only three Surgeons and one Radiologist in the area. Letter from Sam Caddy, Sr. to the Kentucky House of Representatives,
March 7, 1959.
92
S.B. 208, an act "Relating to the Practice of Medicine" was introduced
before the Kentucky Senate on February 18, 1958, was referred to the Committee on Health and Welfare the next day, and was passed by the Senate
March 3, 1958. A full text of the Bill may be found at 1 Journal of the Senate of
the Commonwealth of Kentucky 607 (1958). The Bill then went to the House
of Representatives where it failed to pass.
93 29 U.S.C. § 186 (c) (1947).
94 U.M.W.A. Welfare and Retirement Fund, Report for the Year Ending
June 80, 1958, p. 13.
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specialty, but who is not elected by the active staff of the hospital.
The seven hospitals operating in Kentucky are organized as the
Memorial Hospital Association of Kentucky, Inc. These hospitals refuse to accept indigent or charity cases, but will accept non-union
private patients who have the means to pay for the care received.
This particular facet of the hospital program has placed a very
heavy burden on the small private hospitals of the region which
must take their share of the indigent patients, while losing many of
their paying patients to the better equipped Union hospitals. 95
The Fund spokesmen maintain that at the start of this program
all licensed physicians in the affected area were considered to be
competent and were invited to become participating physicians, under
mutually agreeable contractual arrangements. Under such arrangements, the Fund would pay for medical services rendered to any of
its beneficiaries whether rendered in the Memorial or private hispitals. What happened to change the relationship is inextricably lost
in a maze of charges and counter-charges. The Union maintains that
as data accumulated it became evident that some physicians were
performing surgery of doubtful value and hospitalizing beneficiaries
and their entire families without suffecient medical cause, in order
to milk the Fund for the private gain of the particular doctor. It
found specifically that the amount of surgery being performed on its
patients by some doctors far exceeded the amount being performed
by the same doctors on non-beneficiary patients.9 6 The Fund maintains that it was disappointed that the medical profession took no
official action against these physicians, and immediately began its
own retaliatory measures. Having found that some doctors were overhospitalizing Fund beneficiaries, performing unnecessary surgery ancl
charging excessively for the services rendered for which they were
not qualified, the Fund in 1957 authorized its area medical administrators to prepare lists of "approved specialists" and to leave off such
lists the name of any physician believed to be milking the Fund by
participating in the forementioned activities. The medical profession
charges that:
The Fund has thereby excluded from its approved lists other physicians in some areas who are admittedly well qualified to perform such

services. Furthermore, the Fund has also excluded from its approved
list some surgeons who are board certified. The Fund has also removed some
accredited hospitals and retained some which are not
97
accredited.

The Fund next adopted a policy requiring, in all but emergency cases,
9

5 Louisville Courier Journal, Mar. 15, 1958, p. 1, col. 4-6.
DOId. at 12, col. 3.
97 164 A.M.A.J. 1114 (1957).
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that beneficiaries must be seen in consultation with approved specialists before they could be hospitalized at Fund expense. Then the Fund
began to limit its payments for surgery, as far as practical, to those
physicians who were board-certified, thereby thrusting itself into the
midst of medicine's most heated intra-family row.
These activities of the Fund must be summarized as to total effect. Foregoing any attempt to prosecute charges against the offending physicians before either the county medical society or the State
Board of Health, the Fund has (1) delimited the list of doctors
whom it would pay for services to beneficiaries, and (2) placed the
ultimate decisions on hospitalization and surgery in the hands of approved specialists. In reply, organized medicine immediately charged
an encroachment on free choice of physicians, and the battle was
joined. In justification of its decision, the Fund points to the results
of its new policy, including substantial drops in hospital admission,
days of hospital care and total expenditures for hospital care. Such
results have made the Fund officials adamant in their contention that
only by a limitation of the participation of doctors can the plan continue to offer adequate service at a reasonable cost, and they have
announced publicly their readiness to fight for the right to limit Fund
payment on behalf of beneficiaries to Fund-approved physicians for
services rendered in Fund-approved hospitals.
Organized medicine immediately took the position that all licensed
physicians deserved to be treated alike by the Fund, and launched a
counterattack whereby it unsuccessfully sponsored remedial legislation and began to use its disciplinary powers against the doctors who
participated in the Fund. Organized medicine cannot hope to destroy in the entirety this medical care plan by any utilization of the
corporate-practice-of-medicine doctrine, because the statutory law
of this state and the trend of case decisions in other states have
favored the right of a non-profit corporation to make medical services available to its beneficiaries. Moreover, one Kentucky case
has expressly upheld the right of a private hospital corporation to
deny the use of its facilities to licensed physiciansY8 If this analysis
be correct, the choice of remedies available to the medical profession
is narrowd to three: (1) take refuge in the existing state statutory
law; (2) try again to make it more favorable; or (3) make a cautious
use of its disciplinary powers.
9 Hughes v. Good Samaritan Hospital, 289 Ky. 123, 158 S.W.2d 159
(1942).

99 The question may be raised whether the Fund, functioning through the
Memorial Hospital Association of Kentucky, Inc., is a medical care plan corporation within the meaning of Ky. Rev. Stat. § 303.190. Whether or not it was
organized with this section of the statute in mind, the Fund may well find itself
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The Fund may be acting in violation of KRS sec. 303.19099 in that
it has refused to allow some licensed physicians to participate in its
plan under the same terms and conditions as it has accorded others,
and it has used its power of the purse to impose restrictions on participating physicians in matters of diagnosis and treatment. Although
this statute carries on its face no specific remedy for its breach, the
physician who has been blacklisted would have two remedies: (1) he
may seek to recover damages pursuant to KRS sec. 446.01000 or (2)
since he is a person "whose rights are affected by a statute", he could
bring an action for declaratory judgment0 1 seeking to have the Fund's
activities declared in violation of the statute, and seeking "further
relief' in the form of a court decree requiring the Fund to accord
to him the same privileges and arrangements as it has provided other
licensed physicians in the same area.
Beyond such possible action by the offended physicians, the local
medical societies may, in their discretion, begin to screen membership applications or expel members in an effort to protect the ethical
standards of the profession from encroachment by the plan. It has
already been shown that the factors of free choice of physicians or
fee for service are not adequate grounds for such discipline, and an attempt to discipline on these grounds would simply invite state or
federal anti-trust suits. However, if the Fund is interfering with the
diagnosis and treatment of its beneficiaries and merely using the participating physicians to further this purpose, then those physicians may
well be guilty of unethical conduct within the legitimate use of the
disciplinary powers of the societies. In making the decision to use their
disciplinary powers, the medical societies should consider the Fund's
public proclamations of seeking to lessen its operating expenses of
medical and hospital care, its restrictive limitations on the use of
drugs by other than approved specialists, and the amount of lay
domination exerted over the hospitals and their staffs by the laymen
who actually control the Fund. Organized medicine and the offended physicians must avoid the temptations to bring state antitrust actions, because it would be necessary in such actions to contend
that the practice of medicine is a trade or business, a contention
that organized medicine had fought in the past. The Supreme Court
has never expressly ruled that the practice of medicine is a "trade"
treated as a "803 Corporation Plan", as defined in Ky. Rev. Stat. § 303.010
100 That section of the statute provides:
A person injured by the violation of any statute may recover from the
0

offender such damages as he sustained by reason of the violation, although a penalty or forfeiture is imposed for such violation.

1 1Ky. Rev. Stat. §§ 418.040, .045 (1959).
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within the meaning of the Sherman Antitrust Act, and any more decisions by the state courts holding it to have been a trade at common law would tempt Congress to exercise its powers over interstate commerce to regulate this trade or business. Owners of the
private hospitals which have been blacklisted by the Fund may consider bringing state anti-trust suits without fear of adverse repercussions on the medical profession. Private hospitals operate wholly
within the boundaries of one state, and a decision that they were
conducting a trade or business would not bring them within the purview of the Sherman Act, which purports to prohibit restraints of
trade only in interstate commerce.
The Fund is not in the market for legal remedies at this point, h~ut
is more interested in defenses to charges of illegally practicing medicine, which have already been discussed. If the local medical societies
begin a systematic screening of applicants or expulsion of members
calculated to curtail the activities of the Fund, they may invite both
state and federal anti-trust actions. In such suits the question might
well become whether the holding of American Medical Ass'n v.
United States'0 2 is broad enough to support the claim that a union
hospital and medical service plan is a trade or business.
As a practical matter, the interests of both the Fund and organized
medicine would best be served by the Fund's leaving the professional
diagnosis and treatment of patients up to the participating physicians,
dropping its requirements of drug approval by approved specialists,
giving the active staff of the hospitals the power to select chiefs of
services, and interjecting some professional voices into the administrative decisions of each hospital. The Fund should immediately initiate actions before the State Board of Health and, through its
member physicians, before the local medical societies to have the
physicians charged with fraud stripped of their professional licenses.
Summary
The interjection of a third party into the patient-physician relationship, while it undoubtedly changes it, is not necessarily bad. Whether
or not a particular plan does not utilize free choice of physician or
fee for service should not be decisive as to the legality or desirability
of the plan. What the courts, the statutes and organized medicine
must require of any pre-paid medical care plan is that there be no
interference by laymen in the essential elements of professional carethe diagnosis and treatment of the patient. The courts have made a
distinction between profit and non-profit corporations in the area of
corporate practice of medicine, not because of the financial structure of
102317 U.S. 519 (1943).
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the plan, but because the absence of a profit element renders it less
likely that its lay administrators will seek to control the professional
services of the participating doctors.
State legislation should permit flexibility in medical care plans,
and should neither limit the formation of these plans to members
of the medical profession, nor subject the plans to the unlimited control of the profession. In this respect it would be desirable to change
the existing Kentucky statutory scheme to take from the State Board
of Health the right to ultimately approve the formation of non-profit
medical care plan corporations and to approve all contracts entered
into by such plans.
Organized medicine has every right to uphold the ethical standards of the profession by the use of its disciplinary powers over its
membership. Such power should be confined by the profession and the
courts to issues which have some relevance to the basic elements of
the patient-physician relationship. Organized medicine has been repeatedly castigated for using the word "ethics" as a blind for activities which attempt to restrict and destroy competition.
As to the United Mine Workers dispute, the interests of the public,
the Fund and the medical profession would best be served by the enactment of legislation making it a specific ground for revocation of
a physician's license that he unnecessarily hospitalized or operated
upon a beneficiary of any medical or hospital service plan with an intent to defraud such plan. Such legislation would enable remedial
action to be initiated and prosecuted at a point removed from the professional solidarity of community physicians, based on close contact
and friendship, and be tried under the aegis of the State Board of
Health, whose members, by reason of the great responsibility of
their posts, are likely to be more interested in the preservation of the
good reputation of the profession than in the friendship of the particular offender. Assurance of just consideration of their complaints
should in turn cause the administrators of the Fund to return to
their original position of opening the Fund's facilities and moneys to
all licensed physicians who desire to participate in the rendition of
medical care to its beneficiaries.
Donald D. Harkins

